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Abstract
Standard epistemic logic studies propositional knowledge, yet many other types of
knowledge such as “knowing whether”, “knowing what”, and “knowing how” are frequently
and widely used in everyday life as well as academic fields. An axiomatization of the epis-
temic logic with both regular “knowing that” operator and “conditionally knowing what”
operator is recently given in [Yanjing Wang and Jie Fan. Conditionally knowing what. in
Proceedings of AiML14, April 2014.]. Then the decidability and complexity of this logic
command our study. In this paper, we give an axiomatization and a tableau for the modal
logic with the same operators on arbitrary Kripke models. Given the tableau, the complex-
ity of the satisfiability problem of this logic is PSPACE-complete.
Keywords: Knowing what, modal logic, tableau, PSPACE-complete
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1 Introduction
Standard epistemic logic studies the “knowing that” operator Ki where Kiφ means agent i
knows that φ is true. While this perspective fixed our focus on propositional knowledge, its sim-
plicity also facilitated the studies, extensions, and applications of it. Recent decades witnessed
the prosperity of numerous logics with standard knowing-that operator or similar propositional
operators in fields like philosophy, computer science, and game theory. However, there are also
other interesting knowledge expressions used in our everyday life, like “knowing whether”,
“knowing what”, and “knowing how”, which have raised many interesting questions in linguis-
tics and philosophy, but received less attention in logic.
Among these ways of expressing knowledge, “knowing what” is particularly suitable for the
beginning of our logical study of the myriad of non-standard knowledge operators, for it is a
richer topic compared to “knowing whether”, less contentious than “knowing how” philosophi-
cally, interesting in its own logical and mathematical properties, and readily applicable in other
fields like cryptography. For example, sentences like “he knows that she knows her private key,
but he do not know what exactly his private key is.” are typical in security settings. With the
propositional knowledge operator K alone, we may have a formula KiK jp ∧ ¬Kip to express
this. But by axiom T in standard epistemic logic, this formula is not consistent. Introducing
something new is obviously needed, and several attempts was made recently, such as [3, 8] in
security settings.
In fact, in his grounding work of the epistemic logic [4], Hintikka has already briefly discussed
“knowing who” in ch.6.3, an operator with evident similarity with “knowing what”, in terms of
first-order modal logic. In [7], a seminal work that is hitherto mostly referred to by the studies
of Public Announcement Logic, Plaza also proposed a “knowing what” operator Kv, of course
in the context of Public Announcement Logic. This leaves us a logic with both “knowing what”
and public announcement.
Technically, Kv operator packs an existential quantifier with a modality together, and the re-
sulting logic is a small fragment of first-order modal logic, which requires new techniques to
handle. To deal with the public announcement part, we need to change our perspective and
pack announcement into the “knowing what” operator to make it a conditional one. Thus until
in [11, 10] by Wang and Fan did we see a complete axiomatization of the logic with both the
“knowing what” operator and the model relativization operator, i.e., ELKvr . Because of the
potential application of this logic, such as in the field of computer science and AI as argued
by McCarthy in [6], the decidability and complexity of this logic become important. In [12],
Xiong has shown that ELKvr is decidable for its small model property. As for complexity, this
paper serves as a preliminary step.
In this paper, we show that the axiomatization of Wang and Fan without the characteristic
S5 axioms is also complete w.r.t. the logic on the class of arbitrary models (call it LKvr , that
is, ELKvr without the initial “Epistemic”). We simplifies the proof of completeness in [11]
significantly. With the constraint of reflexivity, there are some interactions between agents,
thus the beautiful property of the conditional part of knowing what operator in one agent is
obscured and complicated. Without such constraint, we can work on the knowledge of an agent
more easily and abstractly.
Moreover, we show that the complexity of the satisfiability of the logic is PSPACE-complete,
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which is no more complex than most normal modal logics and in particular K . This is by way
of a tableau. Normally a tableau means two things: first, to test the satisfiability of a formula,
only its subformula counts, and thus we can do trials on each of those subformulas by setting
it true or false; second, we have a canonical or minimal way to deal with the modal operators,
much like the spirit of Sahlqvist’s minimal assignment method, such that if this minimal way
fails, all possible ways fail necessarily. As for our logic on the model class K, the first property
is also true, and for the second property, there is not “a” canonical way but an array of them,
enumerable within PSPACE.
The rest of this paper is structured as such: we first give the syntax and semantics of LKvrand
its proof system LKVr in section 2. Section 3 presents the completeness results and Section 4
the complexity. We then conclude this paper with future work in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
We follow the notations proposed in [11] . However, since we are now working on arbitrary
Kripke models, it is no longer appropriate to use K as the modal operator. So we now return to
the box and diamond notation.
Given a countably infinite set of proposition letters P, a countably infinite set of agent names I,
and a countably infinite set of (non-rigid) constant symbols D, the language of LKvr is defined
as follows:
φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | (φ ∧φ) | iφ | ∇i(φ, d)
where p ∈ P, i ∈ I, and d ∈ D. Our new operator ∇i(φ, d) here says that, in all possible cases
where φ is true, the value of d is all the same. For example, the sentence “I know your password
if it is a four-digit number” can be expressed as ∇(four-digit_number_password,password).
As usual, we define⊥, (φ∨ψ), (φ→ψ), and ◊iφ as the abbreviations of, respectively, ¬⊤,¬(¬φ∧
¬ψ),¬(φ ∧¬ψ), and ¬i¬φ. Parentheses will be omitted unless confusion arises.
For future convenience, write Sub(φ) for the set of subformulas of φ, where for ∇i(φ, d),
its subformulas are itself plus all the subformulas of φ. Then define Sub+(φ) = {¬φ | φ ∈
Sub(φ)} ∪ Sub(φ). Let D(φ) be the set of the value names that occur in φ. At the same
time, we need depth(φ) denoting the modal depth of φ. For the new operator ∇i, we define
depth(∇i(φ, d)) = depth(φ) + 1. Further, for any finite set of formulas X :
Sub(X ) =
⋃
φ∈X Sub(φ) ¬X = {¬φ | φ ∈ X }
Sub+(X ) =
⋃
φ∈X Sub
+(φ) X\i = {φ |iφ ∈ X }
D(X ) =
⋃
φ∈X D(φ) φX =
∧
φ∈X φ
depth(X ) = max{depth(φ) | φ ∈ X } iX = {iφ | φ ∈ X }
To interpret LKvr , we need to extend common Kripke models to incorporate the assignment of
the names in D, and this can also be seen as a first-order Kripke model with a constant domain.
So a model of LKvr is defined as M = 〈S,O, {→i | i ∈ I},V,VD〉, in which S is a non-empty set
of possible worlds, O is a non-empty set of values,→i is a binary relation on S, V is a function
assigning to each proposition letter p ∈ P a set of possible worlds V (p)⊂ S where p is true, and
VD a function from D×S to O so that each value name d ∈ D at each possible world s is assigned
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a value VD(d , s). Let K denote the class of all models defined above. Now the semantics:
M , s ⊤ always holds
M , s  p ⇔ s ∈ V (p)
M , s  ¬φ ⇔ M , s 2 φ
M , s  φ ∧ψ ⇔ M , s  φ andM , s ψ
M , s  iφ ⇔ for all t such that s→i t :M , t  φ
M , s ∇i(φ, d) ⇔ for any t1, t2 ∈ S such that s→i t1 and s→i t2 :
ifM , t1  φ andM , t2  φ, then VD(d , t1) = VD(d , t2)
Intuitively, ∇i(φ, d) is true at s if and only if in all i−accessible worlds where φ is true, d is
assigned a uniform value. Conversely, for ∇i(φ, d) to be false, there must be two i−accessible
φ−worlds that disagree on the value of d . From the perspective of first-order modal logic,
∇i(φ, d) can be seen as ∃xi(φ → d = x) where x is a rigid variable and c a non-rigid one.
Thus a ∇ is actually a package consists of a quantifier, a modality, an implication, and an
equality.
As for the derivation system, it is enough to just exclude axioms particular to S5 from the system
proposed in [11]:
System LKVr
Axiom Schemas
TAUT all the instances of tautologies
K i(φ→ψ)→ (iφ→iψ)
DISTV i(φ→ψ)→ (∇i(ψ, d)→∇i(φ, d))
V⊥ ∇i(⊥, d)
V∨ ◊i(φ ∧ψ)∧∇i(φ, d)∧∇i(ψ, d)→∇i(φ ∨ψ, d)
Rules
MP
φ,φ→ψ
ψ
NEC
φ
iφ
RE
ψ↔ χ
φ↔ φ[ψ/χ]
3 Completeness
Our proof of the completeness of LKVrproceeds in the standard Henkin way: use maximal
consistent sets as the basis of the canonical model, link the canonical relations properly so that
an existence lemma can be proven, use the existence lemma to prove a truth lemma and then
completeness follows immediately. However, as our ∇ operator packs many things in it, simply
a maximal consistent set does not give us enough information to pin down every possibilities.
Thus, we need to saturate these maximal consistent sets consistently. Specifically, since∇i(φ, d)
is actually ∃x(φ→ d = x), its subformulas (φ → d = x) and d = x need their counterpart
in the canonical model. Now we give the definition:
Definition 1. Denote the set of all maximal consistent sets w.r.t. LKVras MCS and the set of
natural number as N. The canonical modelM c = 〈Sc,N, {→i | i ∈ I},V
c,V c
D
〉 where1:
• Sc consists of all the triples 〈Γ, f , g〉 ∈MCS×ND×(N∪{∗})I×LKv
r×D that satisfy the following
two conditions for any i ∈ I,φ,ψ ∈ LKvr , d ∈ D:
(1) g(i,φ, d) 6= ∗ iff ∇i(φ, d)∧◊iφ ∈ Γ;
1A countable set N is already big enough as the constant domain of objects. See footnote in [11]. Also note that
following clause (2) is slightly different from clause (ii) in [11].
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(2) g(i,φ, d) 6= ∗ and g(i,ψ, d) 6= ∗ imply: g(i,φ, d) = g(i,ψ, d) iff ∇i(φ ∨ψ, d) ∈ Γ
for any s ∈ Sc, we use Γs, fs, gs to denote the three components of s and we simplify φ ∈ Γs
as φ ∈ s.
• For s, t ∈ Sc , s→i t iff the following two conditions are satisfied:
(3) {φ | iφ ∈ s} ⊆ t.
(4) ∇i(φ, d) ∈ s and φ ∈ t imply ft(d) = gs(i,φ, d).
Here, g is the counterpart of (φ → d = x) and f the counterpart of d = x . To be explicit
about their meaning, g(i,φ, d) gives the value of d in all theφ−worlds accessible by i, and f (d)
gives the value of d directly. The star symbol obviously means that if there are no φ−worlds
accessible from i, g(i,φ, d) should reflect this fact by a value not in N.
Given this canonical model, existence lemma is then our aim. In ordinary model logic, it is
enough to use Lindenbaum lemma to extend Γ\i to build a i−successor of Γ. However, as
our canonical model requires more information, or a saturation, we must show that such a
saturation is possible i.e. is consistent with what we already have. The following proposition
states this technically:
Proposition 2. Given a possible world s ∈ Sc, an agent i ∈ I, a maximal consistent set Γ such that
{φ | iφ ∈ s} ⊆ Γ and a natural number x ∈ N, we can construct t = 〈Γ, f , g〉 using x such that
t ∈ Sc and s→i t.
Proof. Note that the only thing we need to do is to construct appropriate f and g so that
t = 〈Γ, f , g〉 satisfies the requirements (1), (2) and (4) stated in definition 1, since (3) is
already satisfied. We first construct f (which is easier) and then g.
For any d ∈ D:
f (d) =
¨
gs(i,φ, d) there exists a φ ∈ LKv
r : φ ∈ Γ and ∇i(φ, d) ∈ s
x otherwise
Obviously, if this f is well-defined, then (4) in definition 1 will be satisfied. Now we claim that
this definition is indeed well-defined, that is, for any φ,ψ ∈ LKvr such that φ ∈ Γ,∇i(φ, d) ∈ s,
ψ ∈ Γ and ∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s, we have gs(i,φ, d) = gs(i,ψ, d).
First, if φ ∈ Γ andψ ∈ Γ, then ◊i(φ∧ψ) ∈ s. Suppose not, since s is maximal, i(¬φ∨¬ψ) ∈ s.
Then ¬φ ∨¬ψ ∈ Γ. Again, since Γ is maximal, either ¬φ ∈ Γ or ¬ψ ∈ Γ. But either way, Γ will
be inconsistent.
Now ◊i(φ ∧ψ),∇i(φ, d),∇i(ψ, d) are all in s. By axiom V∨ and the maximality of s, ∇i(φ ∨
ψ, d) ∈ s. According to clause (2) of definition 1, gs(i,φ, d) = gs(i,ψ, d) and this concludes
the proof of the well-definedness of f .
The construction of g is more involved because of the clause (2). For any i ∈ I and any d ∈ D,
first we construct a partition on the set G(i, d) = {φ ∈ LKvr | ∇i(φ, d)∧◊iφ ∈ Γ}. Note that this
set is exactly the collection of formulas that we need to give a non-star value through g(i,φ, d),
and the clause (2) is effective only on this set. For any two φ,ψ ∈ G(i, d), let φ ∼i,d ψ iff
∇i(φ ∨ψ, d) ∈ Γ. Now we claim that ∼i,d is an equivalence relation:
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Reflexivity For φ ∈ G(i, d), by definition of G(i, d), ∇i(φ, d) ∈ Γ. By TAUT, φ↔ φ ∨φ. By
RE and the maximality of Γ, ∇i(φ ∨φ, d) ∈ Γ. So φ ∼i,d φ.
Symmetry For φ,ψ ∈ G(i, d), if φ ∼i,d ψ, then ∇i(φ ∨ψ, d) ∈ Γ. By TAUT and RE, ⊢ ∇i(φ ∨
ψ, d)↔∇i(ψ∨φ, d). By maximality of Γ, ∇i(ψ∨φ, d) ∈ Γ. So ψ ∼i,d φ.
Transitivity This is more interesting. For φ,ψ,χ ∈ G(i, d), suppose φ ∼i,d ψ and ψ ∼i,d χ.
By definition, we have ◊iψ, ∇i(φ ∨ψ, d) and ∇i(ψ∨χ, d) all in Γ. Notice that we have
following derivation:
[1] ψ→ (φ ∨ψ)∧ (ψ∨χ) TAUT
[2] ◊iψ→ ◊i((φ ∨ψ)∧ (ψ∨χ)) K rule
[3]
◊i((φ ∨ψ)∧ (ψ∨χ))∧∇i(φ ∨ψ, d)∧∇i(ψ∨ χ, d)
→∇i((φ ∨ψ)∨ (ψ∨χ), d)
V∨
[4] (φ ∨ χ)→ (φ ∨ψ)∨ (ψ∨χ) TAUT
[5] i((φ ∨χ)→ (φ ∨ψ)∨ (ψ∨χ)) NEC
[6] ∇i((φ ∨ψ)∨ (ψ∨χ), d)→∇i(φ ∨χ, d) DISTV,[5]
[6] ◊iψ∧∇i(φ ∨ψ, d)∧∇i(ψ∨χ, d)→∇i(φ ∨χ, d) [2][3][6]
Since Γ is a maximal consistent set w.r.t. LKVr , this tells us that ∇i(φ ∨ χ, d) ∈ Γ. So
φ ∼i,d χ.
Write [φ]i,d = {ψ ∈ G(i, d) | ψ ∼i,d φ}. Since I,P,D are all countable, LKv
r is countable, then
G(i, d) is countable, so {[φ]i,d | φ ∈ G(i, d)} is countable. Then there is an injection hi,d from
{[φ]i,d | φ ∈ G(i, d)} to N. Now we can define g:
g(i,φ, d) =
¨
hi,d([φ]i,d) φ ∈ G(i, d)
∗ otherwise
It’s now easy to see that this definition satisfies (1) and (2) of definition 1.
For future convenience, we call this construction as F , that is, F(s,Γ,a, x) = 〈Γ, f , g〉 where f
and g are defined as above.
After the above proposition, we are now able to prove existence lemma. First is the existence
lemma for ¬iφ:
Lemma 3. For any s ∈ Sc, any i ∈ I, any φ ∈ LKvr : ¬iφ ∈ s implies that there is a world t ∈ S
c
such that s→i t and ¬ψ ∈ t.
Proof. It is a standard modal logic exercise to show that X = {¬ψ}∪{φ | iφ ∈ s} is consistent.
By Lindenbaum Lemma (for LKvr), X can be extended into a MCS Γ. Then by proposition 2, Γ
can again be extended into a possible world t = F(s,Γ, i, 0) ∈ Sc such that s→i t. Since ¬ψ ∈ X ,
¬ψ ∈ t.
Now we need to deal with formulas in the form of ¬∇i(ψ, d). Following the convention of
dealing with ¬iψ, what we need to do is to show that if ¬∇i(ψ, d) is present in some possible
world s, then there are indeed t1, t2 ∈ S
c such that s→i t1, s→i t2 and ft1(d) 6= ft2(d). More
specifically:
Lemma 4. For any s ∈ Sc such that ¬∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s, there exists t1, t2 ∈ S
c such that ψ ∈ t1,
ψ ∈ t2, s→i t1, s→i t2 and ft1(d) 6= ft2(d).
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Proof. Suppose s ∈ Sc and ¬∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s. Now we intend to prove
(!) there exists t1, t2 ∈ S
c such that ψ ∈ t1, ψ ∈ t2, s→i t1, s→i t2 and ft1(d) 6= ft2(d).
Again we use the notation G(i, d) = {φ ∈ LKvr | ∇i(φ, d) ∧ ◊iφ ∈ s},∼i,d= {〈φ1,φ2〉 ∈
G(i, d)2 | ∇i(φ1 ∨φ2, d) ∈ s} and [φ]i,d = {φ
′ ∈ G(i, d) | φ ∼i,d φ
′} as defined in proposition
2. Let A= {φ | iφ ∈ s}, A
+ = A∪{ψ}, G(i, d) = {¬χ | χ ∈ G(i, d)}. Note that A+ is consistent.
Suppose it is not, then there is a finite subset B of A such that ⊢
∧
B → ¬ψ. By NEC and
distribution of i, ⊢
∧
iB→ i(¬φ). Since iB ⊆ s, i(¬ψ) ∈ s. ¬ψ is equivalent to ψ→⊥
and this means i(ψ→ ⊥) ∈ s. By DISTV and V⊥, ∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s, contradicting to supposition
that ¬∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s.
Now we prove (!) by two cases:
Case 1: A+ ∪ G(i, d) is consistent. Then A+ ∪ G(i, d) can be extended by Lindenbaum Lemma
to a maximal consistent set, say Γ. Let Γ1 = Γ2 = Γ, t1 = F(s,Γ1, i, 0) and t2 = F(s,Γ2, i, 1) and
we have the following:
• ψ ∈ t1, ψ ∈ t2, s→i t1, s→i t2. By the construction method of F , this is immediate.
• ft1(d) = 0, ft2(d) = 1. From the construction rule of f in proposition 2, we can see that
these are true, by the fact that for all φ ∈ LKvr , either φ 6∈ Γ or ∇i(φ, d) 6∈ s and . In
fact if ∇i(φ, d) ∈ s, then φ ∈ G(i, d), ¬φ ∈ G(i, d). This means ¬φ ∈ Γ and by the
consistency of Γ, φ 6∈ Γ
With the above facts, the (!) is obviously true now.
Case 2: A+ ∪ G(i, d) is inconsistent. Then there is a finite subset G(i, d)0 of G(i, d) and a finite
subset A0 of A such that ⊢
∧
A0 ∧ψ → ¬
∧
G(i, d)0. Let G(i, d)0 = {χ | ¬χ ∈ G(i, d)0}. By
the fact that ⊢ ¬
∧
G(i, d)0 ↔
∨
G(i, d)0, we have ⊢
∧
A0 ∧ψ→
∨
G(i, d)0. For convenience,
name this formula δ0
At this point, we need to split case 2 into two subcases, with the following proposition as the
dividing line:
(*) for any χ0 ∈ G(i, d) there is a χ ∈ G(i, d) such that χ 6∈ [χ0]i,d and A
+ ∪ {χ} is consistent.
Case 2.1: (*) is true. Since this still under Case 2, A+∪G(i, d) is inconsistent, which implies that
there is a χ1 ∈ G(i, d) such that A
+ ∪ {χ1} is consistent (A
+’s consistency is needed here). This
implies, with (*), that there is a χ2 ∈ G(i, d) such that χ2 6∈ [χ1]i,d and A
+ ∪ {χ2} is consistent.
The former means χ1 6∼i,d χ2, thus ∇i(χ1 ∨ χ2, d) 6∈ s, which in turn means gs(i,χ1, d) 6=
gs(i,χ2, d) by the definition 1. Now since A∪ {χ1} and A∪ {χ2} are both consistent, let Γ1 and
Γ2 be the MCSs extended by them respectively, and t1 = F(s,Γ1, i, d) and t2 = F(s,Γ2, i, d). It
is not hard to see that ft1(d) = gs(i,χ1, d) 6= gs(i,χ2, d) = ft2(d), which justifies (!).
Case 2.2: (*) is false. Then the following
(**) there exists a χ0 ∈ G(i, d) such that for any χ ∈ G(i, d), if χ 6∈ [χ0]i,d then A
+ ∪ {χ} is
inconsistent.
is true. Under this supposition, let χ0 be the element in G(i, d) such that for any χ ∈ G(i, d). If
χ 6∈ [χ0]i,d then A
+ ∪{χ} is inconsistent. Further, let [χ0]
0
i,d
= G(i, d)0 ∩ [χ0]i,d . Then, for any
χ ∈ G(i, d)0 \ [χ0]
0
i,d
, χ 6∈ [χ0]i,d , so A
+ ∪ {χ} is inconsistent, which means ⊢
∧
A′0 ∧ψ→ ¬χ
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(note it as δχ) for some finite subset A
′
0 of set A. Combining ⊢ δχ for all χ ∈ G(i, d)0 \ [χ0]
0
i,d
,
we have ⊢
∧
A′′0 ∧ψ → ¬
∨
(G(i, d)0 \ [χ0]
0
i,d
) again for some finite subset A′′0 of A. Note this
long formula by δ1. Notice the following proof schema:
(1) ⊢
∨
X → (
∨
Y ∨
∨
(X \ Y ))
(2) ⊢
∨
X → (¬
∨
(X \ Y )→
∨
Y )
(3) ⊢ (
∨
X ∧¬
∨
(X \ Y ))→
∨
Y
Using this schema, and the fact that ⊢ δ0, ⊢ δ1, we have the following proof:
(4) ⊢
∧
A0 ∧ψ→
∨
G(i, d)0 [this is δ0]
(5) ⊢
∧
A′′0 ∧ψ→¬
∨
(G(i, d)0 \ [χ0]
0
i,d
) [this is δ1]
(6) ⊢
∧
A0 ∧
∧
A′′0 ∧ψ→
∨
G(i, d)0 ∧¬
∨
(G(i, d)0 \ [χ0]
0
i,d
)
(7) ⊢
∧
A0 ∧
∧
A′′0 ∧ψ→
∨
[χ0]
0
i,d
(8) ⊢
∧
A0 ∧
∧
A′′0 → (ψ→
∨
[χ0]
0
i,d
)
(9) ⊢i(
∧
A0 ∧
∧
A′′0)→i(ψ→
∨
[χ0]
0
i,d
)
By definition of A and maximality, i(
∧
A0 ∧
∧
A′′0) ∈ s, so (***): i(ψ→
∨
[χ0]
0
i,d
) ∈ s.
Now we use a simple induction to show that ∇i(
∨
[χ0]
0
i,d
, d) ∈ s. Enumerate the formula in
[χ0]
0
i,d
as λ1,λ2, . . .λn and inductively define Λ1 = {λ1},Λk = Λk−1 ∪ {λk}.
Induction Hypothesis gs(i,
∨
Λk, d) = gs(i,χ0, d) and ∇i(
∨
Λk, d) ∈ s.
Induction Basis λ1 ∼i,d χ0 so ∇i(λ1 ∨ χ0, d) ∈ s, then gs(i,λ1, d) = gs(i,χ0, d). Since λ1 ∈
G(i, d), ∇i(λ1, d) ∈ s automatically.
Induction Step For Λk = Λk−1 ∪{λk}, firstly, by the same kind of argument in induction basis,
gs(i,λk, d) = gs(i,χ0, d). By IH, gs(i,χ0, d) = gs(i,
∨
Λk−1, d). So by the requirement (2)
of a suitable possible canonical world in definition 1 imposed on s, ∇i(
∨
Λk−1 ∨λk, d) =
∇i(
∨
Λk, d) ∈ s. Since ⊢ λk →
∨
Λk, ⊢ ◊iλk → ◊iΛk. Yet λk ∈ G(i, d) so ◊iλk ∈ s, then
◊i
∨
Λk ∈ s. Then both gs(i,λk, d) and gs(i,Λk, d) are not ∗. So by (2) of definition 1
again, gs(i,Λk, d) = gs(i,λk, d) = gs(i,χ0, d).
By induction proof, ∇i(
∨
[χ0]
0
i,d
, d) = ∇i(
∨
Λn, d) ∈ s. Then with DISTV and (***) we have
proven, ∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s. But the proposition we intend to prove supposes ¬∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s. Thus
this case 2.2 is actually empty.
Now we are prepared to prove the truth lemma forM c:
Lemma 5 (truth lemma). For any s ∈ Sc and any φ ∈ LKvr , φ ∈ s iffM c, s  φ.
Proof. The inductive proof of this is a common practice in modal logic. Here we only show the
two non-trivial cases:
φ =iψ If iψ ∈ s, then for any t ∈ S
c such that s→i t, by the clause (3) of definition 1,
ψ ∈ t, which by IH meansM c, t  ψ. SoM c, s  iψ. For the other direction, suppose
iψ 6∈ s, then ¬iψ ∈ s. By lemma 3 and IH,M
c, s 6 iψ.
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φ =∇i(ψ, d) If ∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s, then for any t1, t2 ∈ S
c such that s→i t1, t2 and ψ ∈ t1, t2, by the
clause (4) of definition 1, ft1(d) = gs(i,ψ, d) = ft2(d). For the other direction, suppose
∇i(ψ, d) 6∈ s, then ¬∇i(ψ, d) ∈ s. By lemma 4 and IH, we have t1, t2 ∈ S
c such that
s→i t1, t2,M
c, t1 ψ,M
c, t2 ψ and ft1(d) 6= ft2(d). SoM
c , s 6∇i(ψ, d).
Based on this, we are able to present:
Theorem 6. LKVr is sound and strongly complete for LKvr .
Proof. Soundness is rather simple. For any consistent set∆ ⊆ LKvr , using Lindenbaum Lemma
for LKvr , there exists a MCS Γ such that ∆ ⊆ Γ. Now let f be a constant function from D to
0, and g be defined in the exactly same fashion as in proposition 2. According to definition 1,
s = 〈Γ, f , g〉 ∈ Sc, so by truth lemma, for any φ ∈ ∆,M c, s  φ and thus ∆ is satisfiable. Then
strong completeness follows.
4 Complexity
In this section, we will give a PSPACE algorithm in light of tableau method for the satisfiability
problem of LKvr . Since LKvrcontains K, the lower bound is also PSPACE. So we can conclude
that the decision problem of LKvr is PSPACE-complete.
4.1 Rules of tableau
Definition 7. A propositional tableau is a set of formula X satisfying the following:
• if ¬¬φ ∈ T then φ ∈ T,
• if ¬(φ ∧ψ) ∈ T then ¬φ ∈ T or ¬ψ ∈ T,
• if φ ∧ψ ∈ T then φ ∈ T and ψ ∈ T,
• if φ ∈ T then ¬φ 6∈ T and vice versa,
We call a violation of the last clause “blatantly inconsistent”. X is fully expanded if and only if for
any φ ∈ X and ψ a subformula of φ, either ψ or ¬ψ is in X .
Definition 8. A state is a tuple 〈X , g,h,ha,hb〉 satisfying:
• X is a fully expanded propositional tableau.
• Let EX = {〈i, d〉 | for some φ,∇i(φ, d) ∈ X }, GX (i, d) = {φ | ∇i(φ, d) ∈ X }, EX (i) = {d |
〈i, d〉 ∈ EX }.
• g is a function defined on set EX . g(i, d) is a 2-tuple 〈A,B〉 such that:
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– A⊆ GX (i, d), B ⊆P (GX (i, d));
– A∪
⋃
B = GX (i, d), A∩
⋃
B = ;;
– B is a partition of
⋃
B, always including empty set;
In the sequel let g(i, d)[1] denote such A and g(i, d)[2] for such B.
• h is a function defined on set {〈i,φ〉 | ¬iφ ∈ X }. h(i,φ) is again a function defined on
EX (i). For every d ∈ EX (i), h(i,φ)(d) ∈ g(i, d)[2].
• ha, hb are both function defined on set {〈i,φ, d〉 | ¬∇i(φ, d)}. ha(i,φ, d) and ha(i,φ, d)
are again functions defined on set EX (i)∪ {d} such that for d
′ in their domain:
– if d ′ ∈ EX (i), then g(i, d
′) is defined, and ha(i,φ, d)(d ′) ∈ g(i, d ′)[2], hb(i,φ, d)(d ′) ∈
g(i, d ′)[2];
– if d ′ 6∈ Ex(i), then d
′ = d. In this case ha(i,φ, d)(d ′) = hb(i,φ, d)(d ′) = ;;
– either ha(i,φ, d)(d) 6= hb(i,φ, d)(d) or both of them are ;.
As we did in the proof of completeness, these functions g,h,ha,hb are also “extra information”.
The function g here is actually a enumeration of all possible equivalence relation ∼i,d given in
the proof of proposition 2.
It is worthwhile here to briefly discuss the number of possible g,h,ha,hb for a given X . Obvi-
ously |EX |, |EX (i)|, |GX (i, d)| ≤ |X |. For function g, note that A and B together forms a partition
of |GX (i, d)|. So the cardinality of the range of g is at most |X |
|X |. Since the domain of g is
EX , the cardinality of the domain of g is at most |X |. Thus the total number of possible g is
at most |X ||X |
|X |
= |X ||X |
2
. Similarly, the number of all possible h, ha and hb are bounded by
|X ||X |. Summing all these together, given X , the number of all possible 〈g,h,ha,hb〉 is at most
|X ||X |
2+3×|X |.
Now we present the method of deciding the satisfiability of a LKvr formula φ0 trough building
a tree. In the following rules, L means the formula set of a node, F represents the additional
information needed (g,h,ha,hb), and C is a partial function from D(φ0) to Z represents the
required assignments of value names occurred in φ0. Since the set of all finite subsets of a
countable set is also countable, there is a function, say, code(X ) to code each finite set of
formulas into a unique positive integer.
1. Construct a tree with a single node s0 as its root, and let L(s0) = {φ0}, F(s0) = ;,C(s0) =
;.
2. Repeatedly try each of following rules in their order until none of them applies:
(a) Forming propositional tableau: if s is a leaf node, L(s) is not blatantly inconsistent
and not a propositional tableau, then there must be a ψ ∈ L(s) such that following
3 rules applies:
i. if ψ = ¬¬χ, add a new node s′ and an edge between s and s′ to the tree(i.e. a
successor of s), and set L(s′) = L(s)∪ {χ}, F(s′) = F(s),C(s′) = C(s).
ii. ifψ= ¬(χ1∧χ2), add two successor s1, s2 of s, and set L(si) = L(s)∪{¬χi}, F(si) =
F(s),C(si) = C(s) for i = 1,2.
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iii. if ψ = χ1 ∧ χ2, add a successor s
′ of s and set L(s′) = L(s) ∪ {χ1,χ2}, F(s
′) =
F(s),C(s′) = C(s).
(b) Forming fully expanded propositional tableau: if s is a leaf node, L(s) is a
propositional tableau but not a fully expanded propositional tableau, then there
must be φ ∈ Sub(L(s)) such that φ and ¬φ are both not in L(S). In this case
add two successor s1, s2 of s and set L(s1) = L(s) ∪ {φ}, L(s2) = L(s) ∪ {¬φ},
F(s1) = F(s2) = F(s),C(s1) = C(s2) = C(s).
(c) forming state: if s is a leaf node, L(s) is a fully expanded propositional tableau, but
〈L(s), F(s)〉 is not a state, then for all function tuple F ′ such that 〈L(s), F ′〉 is a state,
add a successor s′ to s and set L(s′) = L(s), F(s′) = F ′,C(s′) = C(s). Notice that the
total number of such F ′ is bounded by |φ0|
|φ0|
2+3×|φ0 |, as argued above.
(d) Add labeled successors: if s is a leaf node, 〈L(s), F(s)〉 is a state and in L(s) there
are at least one formula of the form ¬iφ or ¬∇i(φ, d0), then there should be some
labeled successors to s:
• For each φ such that ¬iφ ∈ L(s), add an i-successor(i.e. with an edge labeled
i) s′ to s and set L(s′) =
{¬φ} ∪ L(s)\i ∪
⋃
d∈EL(s)(i)
¬
 
gs(i, d)[1]∪
⋃
gs(i, d)[2]\hs(i,φ)(d)

C(s′) = hs(i,φ) and F(s
′) all empty functions.
• For each φ such that ¬∇i(φ, d0) ∈ L(s), add two i-successor sa and sb to s and
for x = a, b, set L(sx ) =
{φ} ∪ L(s)\i ∪
⋃
d∈EL(s)(i)
¬
 
gs(i, d)[1]∪
⋃
gs(i, d)[2]\hx s(i,φ, d0)(d)

Set C(sx ) = hx s(i,φ, d0) for x = a, b. If has(i,φ, d0)(d0) = hbs(i,φ, d0)(d0)
then change C(sa)(d0) to • and C(sb)(d0) to ◦. Finally set F(sx ) = ;.
(e) Mark satisfiable: if s is not yet marked, non of the above three rules applies, and
all its successors(possibly none) have been marked, then:
• if the edges to the successors of s are not labeled, then mark s as "satisfiable" if
any one of its successors is marked "satisfiable", otherwise mark "unsatisfiable".
• if the edges to the successors of s are labeled, then mark s as "satisfiable" if all
of its successors are marked "satisfiable", otherwise mark "unsatisfiable".
• if s has no successors, then mark s as "satisfiable" if L(s) is not blatantly incon-
sistent, otherwise mark "unsatisfiable".
3. if root s0 is marked "satisfiable" then return φ0 is satisfiable, otherwise φ0 is unsatisfiable.
Lemma 9. For any LKvr formula φ0, the tree construction method defined above terminates.
Proof. It is immediate to see that if s′ is a successor of s generated by rule (1) or (2) then
L(s) ( L(s′) but for all s in the tree, L(s)⊆ Sub+(φ0). If s
′ is generated from s by rule (3), then
rule (1) (2) and (3) are no longer applicable to s′. This means the longest chain of unlabeled
edges will not exceed 2× |φ0|+ 1 otherwise there must be a blatant inconsistency. At the same
time, if s′ is generated from s by rule (4), then depth(L(s′))< depth(L(s)). Thus in any branch
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the number of labeled edges will not exceed |φ0|. So we can conclude that the depth of the
tree is bounded by 2 ∗ |φ0|
2. On the other hand, the branching number for any node is also
bounded by |φ0|
|φ0|
2+3×|φ0 |. So this construction must terminate.
After proving that this tableau must halt, the correctness of this tableau must be argued for
now. Correctness means that, root s0 is marked “satisfiable” if and only if φ0 is satisfiable. The
following two lemmas present two directions of correctness respectively.
Lemma 10. For any LKvr formula φ0, if after the tree construction defined above, root s0 is marked
“satisfiable”, then φ0 is satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose the root is marked “satisfiable”. Then we can build a model satisfying φ0 from
the constructed tree. LetM = 〈W,O, {→i | i = 1..n},V,VD〉 where:
• W = {s | s is marked “satisfiable” and 〈L(s), F(s)〉 is a state};
• O = all finite subset of LKvrplus • and ◦;
• s→i t if and only if there exists s
′ ∈W such that s′ is an i-successor of s and t is reachable
from s through a sequence of unlabeled edges;
• for all s ∈W , if p ∈ L(s) then s ∈ V (p), if ¬p ∈ L(s) then s 6∈ V (p);
• for all s ∈W , if C(s)(d) is defined, then VD(d , s) = C(s)(d).
By our construction method, there must be such a model. Now we can prove that if φ ∈ L(s)
thenM , s  φ by a induction on Sub+(φ0). We give the key step of that induction:
• if ∇i(φ, d) ∈ L(s), then d ∈ EL(s)(i) and φ ∈ GL(s)(i, d). Since 〈L(s), F(s)〉 is a state,
gs(i, d) satisfies the clauses in the definition of state. Particularly, φ ∈ GL(s)(i, d) =
gs(i, d)[1]∪
⋃
gs(i, d)[2]. Consider following two cases:
– if φ ∈ gs(i, d)[1], then by restraints on gs and has and rule (d), it is immediate that
for all i-successors of s s′, ¬φ ∈ L(s′). Thus for all s′′ reachable from s′ through
a sequence of unlabeled edges, ¬φ ∈ L(s′′). So if s→i t, ¬φ ∈ L(t). By induction
hypothesis,M , t 6 φ. Thus ∇i(φ, d) is trivially true on s.
– if φ ∈
⋃
gs(i, d)[2], then there is a unique X ∈ gs(i, d)[2] such that φ ∈ X . Now
for any t such that s→i t, by the property of →i, there exists s
′ such that s′ is an i-
successor of s and t is reachable from s′ through a sequence of unlabeled edges. By
rule (d), s′ must be generated by a formula of the form ¬iψ or ¬∇i(ψ, d0). W.l.o.g
we suppose it is generated by ¬∇i(ψ, d0) and has. If φ ∈ L(s
′), then ¬φ 6∈ L(s′),
because s′ must be marked “satisfiable” and thus is not blatantly inconsistent. Again
by rule (d), φ ∈ has(i,ψ, d0)(d) for if not so, φ will in
⋃
gs(i, d)[2]\has(i,ψ, d0)(d),
then ¬φ will be in L(s′), contradiction. By the constraints on has, has(i,ψ, d0)(d)
must be X . Then by rule (d) again, C(s′)(d) = X and thus C(t)(d) = X . With this
frame of argument, we can conclude that for all t such that s→i t, if φ ∈ L(t) then
C(t)(d) = X . By induction hypothesis (M , t  φ implies φ ∈ L(t)) and restraint on
VD, we can conclude thatM , s ∇i(φ, d).
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• if ¬∇i(φ, d) ∈ L(s), then it is immediate from rule (d) that there are two i-successor sa
and sb such that φ ∈ L(sa),φ ∈ L(sb),C(sa) 6= C(sb). Since s is marked “satisfiable”,
sa and sb must also be so. By rule (e) and the finiteness of this tree, there must be ta,
tb in W and reachable through a sequence of unlabeled edges from sa and sb respec-
tively. Then φ ∈ L(ta) and φ ∈ L(tb) and C(ta)(d) = C(sa)(d) 6= C(sb)(d) = C(tb)(d).
By induction hypothesis and M ’s properties, s→i ta, s→i tb, M , ta  φ, M , tb  φ,
VD(d , ta) 6= VD(d , tb). SoM , s  ¬∇i(φ, d).
• If M , s  ∇i(φ, d) then ∇i(φ, d) ∈ L(s). For suppose not, then ¬∇i(φ, d) ∈ L(s), then
M , s  ¬∇i(φ, d), contradiction. Similar results goes for ¬∇i(φ, d).
Since the root is marked “satisfiable”, there must be a s reachable through unlabeled edges
from s0 such that s ∈W . Then φ0 ∈ L(s) and thenM , s  φ0, so φ0 is satisfiable.
Lemma 11. If φ0 is satisfiable, then after the construction for φ0, root s0 will be marked “satisfi-
able”.
Proof. Through a induction from leaves to roots, we show that if 〈L(s), F(s)〉 is not a state and
L(s) is satisfiable, then s is marked “satisfiable”.
First, if s is a leaf, and L(s) is satisfiable, then L(s) must not be blatantly inconsistent. But since
s is a leaf, this suffices for s to be marked “satisfiable”.
If s is not a leaf and rule (a) or (b) was applied to s: w.l.o.g we show the case where (b) was
applied to s, generating successor s1 and s2. Suppose both L(s1) and L(s2) are unsatisfiable,
then by completeness theorem we have shown, they are inconsistent. SoφL(s)→ φ and φL(s)→
¬φ are derivable. Thus φL(s) → ⊥ is derivable, L(s) is inconsistent. By soundness, L(s) is
unsatisfiable. Take a contraposition, we have if L(s) is satisfiable, then either L(s1) or L(s2) is
satisfiable. By induction hypothesis (note that s1 and s2 are not states), either s1 or s2 is marked
“satisfiable”. By rule (e), s is marked “satisfiable”.
If s is not a leaf and rule (c) was applied to s: suppose L(s) is satisfiable, letM , s = 〈W,O, {→i |
i = 1, . . . ,n},V,VD〉, s be the model that satisfies L(s). Now let g be a function on EL(s) such
that:
• g(i, d)[1] = {φ ∈ GL(s)(i, d) | for all t such thats→i t,M , t 6 φ};
• g(i, d)[2] is the partition of set {φ ∈ GL(s)(i, d) | there existst : s→i t,M , t  φ} defined
by relation ∼ where ψ1 ∼ ψ2 if and only if there exists t1, t2 such that s→i t1, s→i t2,
M , t1  ψ, M , t2  ψ, VD(d , t1) = VD(d , t2). This ∼ relation is evidently a equivalence
relation. Let f (i, d , x) be the unique set X ∈ g(i, d)[2] such that there exists ψ ∈ X and
t ∈ W such that M , t  ψ and VD(d , t) = x . If there is no such a X in g(i, d)[2], let
f (i, d , x) = ;.
Then, let h be a function on {〈i,ψ〉 | ¬iψ ∈ L(s)}. By supposition, M , s  ¬iψ for any
i,ψ in the domain of h. This means there exists t ∈W such that s→i t andM , t 6 ψ. Now let
h∗(i,ψ) = t and h(i,ψ) be a function on EL(s)(i) such that h(i,ψ)(d) = f (i, d ,VD(d , t)). Further,
let ha,hb be functions on {〈i,ψ, d0〉 | ¬∇i(ψ, d0) ∈ L(s)}. By supposition, M , s  ¬∇i(ψ, d0)
for any 〈i,ψ, d0〉 in the domain of ha and hb. This means there exists ta, tb ∈ W such that
both of them is accessible from s through i, satisfies ψ but VD(d0, ta) 6= VD(d0, tb). Now for
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x = a, b, let hx ∗(i,ψ, d0) = tx and let hx (i,ψ, d0) be a function on EL(s)(i) ∪ {d0} such that
h(i,ψ, d0)(d) = f (i, d ,VD(d , tx )) for d ∈ EL(s)(i) and if d0 6∈ EL(s)(i), set hx (i,ψ, d0)(d0) = ;.
Now it is evident that 〈L(s), g,h,ha,hb〉 is a state, so by rule (c), there will be a successor s′ of
s such that F(s′) = 〈g,h,ha,hb〉. It is also not hard to see that after applying rule (d) to s′, for
every successor s′′ of s′, L(s′′) is satisfiable, because if s′′ is generated by h(i,ψ) (or ha(i,ψ, d0),
hb(i,ψ, d0)), thenM ,h
∗(i,ψ) (or ha∗(i,ψ, d0),hb
∗(i,ψ, d0))  L(s
′′).
To see this more clearly, suppose s′′ is generated by ha(i,ψ, d0) and let t = ha
∗(i,ψ, d0). If
α ∈ L(s′′), then by rule (d), there are several cases:
• α=ψ. By selection of ha∗(i,ψ, d0), this is evident;
• α ∈ L(s)\i . Since s→i t, this is also evident;
• for some d ∈ EL(s)(i), α ∈ ¬g(i, d)[1]. By definition of g(i, d)[1], every i-accessible world
from s refutes every formula in g(i, d)[1]. SoM , t  α.
• for some d ∈ EL(s)(i), α ∈ ¬
 ⋃
g(i, d)[2]\ha(i,ψ, d0)(d)

. Let α = ¬β . Then β does
not belong to ha(i,ψ, d0)(d). Towards a contradiction suppose that M , t  β , then by
definition of f , f (i, d ,VD(d , t)) = [β]∼. By definition of ha, ha(i,ψ, d0)(d) = [β]∼, so
β ∈ ha(i,ψ, d0)(d), contradiction. Thus,M , t  ¬β .
In conclusion, there is a successor s′ of s such that for every successor s′′ of s′, L(s′′) is satis-
fiable. By induction hypothesis, all such s′′ is marked “satisfiable”. By rule (e), s′ is marked
“satisfiable”, and so is s.
It is straightforward to turn the above construction method into an algorithm running in poly-
nomial space, using a depth-first search. For stepping down in the search tree, we need to
record where we are currently by a stack where in every level a set of subformulas of φ0 is
kept and the height of this stack is at most |φ0|
2. Thus we need O (|φ0|
2 × |φ0|) space. As
the width of this tableau is exceedingly large, extra space is needed for branching. We need
to enumerate all possible F properly. At each level of the stack, we need to record where we
are when enumerating F so that the next F can be calculated. This consumes O (|φ0|
2 × |φ0|
2)
space. This means this algorithm runs in O (|φ0|
4) space, that is, in PSPACE. Since this logic
also contains modal logic K, its satisfiability problem is PSPACE-hard. So we have theorem:
Theorem 12. The satisfiability problem for logic LKvr is PSPACE-complete.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that LKVr is sound and complete w.r.t. LKvr over arbitrary models
and gave a tableau for this logic. This is just a start of the study of the complexity of similar
“knowing what” logics.
Our proof of the completeness is relatively simpler than its counterpart in [11]. Exactly what
makes this possible needs further investigation, and we conjecture that, if this cause can be
found, we may give a beautiful frame of completeness proof upon which proving completeness
results on other special model classes will be easier.
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Our tableau is not simple, and more importantly, unlike tableaux for normal modal logics where
if a formula is unsatisfiable, a proof of its negation can be effectively constructed, our tableau
for LKvr cannot provide this proof now. This commands further study, but our conjecture here
is that, a proof of the negation of an unsatisfiable formula is attainable from this tableau or a
slightly tweaked version, even though it is not found yet.
The complexity of ELKvr is what attracted us initially, and our tableau may shed some light on
it. Yet it is still arguable whether it is in PSPACE. To make things more explicit, we should try
adding formulas d = x and i(φ → d = x) directly into the tableau instead of using Gi(φ, d)
and partitions, which may only work on model class K.
Last but not least, we should consider extending our language to incorporate more first-order
characteristics, such as predicate or equality. If such extension does not bring too much com-
plexity or other undesirable property, we may also try to give a good logic on encryption, as
Cohen and Dam did in [1].
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